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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Markcus

Raymond

May appeals

from

the dismissal

with

prejudice of his

Post-Conviction Petition Fifth District Court Case No. CV-2013-0001240 filed
March 25, 2013 and dismissed without an evidentiary hearing on October 11, 2013.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mr. May disputes the factual findings of the state and court in this case.
he asserts actual innocence, and claimes he only plead guilty due to counsels
refusal to go to trial and present 'any' evidence in his behalf at all. Mr May
has and does assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Mr. Ben Anderson.
who not only lied to Mr. May about the plea deal, but refused to prepare for
trial or go to trial. Ads Mr. may indicated in his petition and at hearing, when
he tried to fire Mr. Anderson for refusing to defend him in any fashion, the
trial court refused to remove counsel and threatened Mr. May with deprivation of
due processes if he did not continue with counsel and plead guilty.
When Mr. May filed a motion to withdraw his plea due to an actual innocence
claim, supported with colorable evidence, the trial court again threatened Mr.
may and refused to a 11 ow a p1ea withdraw prior to sentencing, and refused to
allow evidentiary on the claims and evidence submitted by Mr. May.
In the Post-Conviction proceedings, the district court refused to allow Mr.
May to present any of the evidence that supports his actual innocence claim.
Furthermore, the court refused to consider Mr. May's ineffective assistance of
counsel

claims, even though the

record clearly

indicated that there was a

documented conflict of interest with counsel for refusing to prepare for trial or
do anything except force his client to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit.
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Mr. May is completely unable to refer to specific pages in the record due to
the courts refusla to provide him with the record and evidence and exhibits used
against him at trial or at the post-conviction proceedings. Repeated requests to
counsel and the court for the record has met with no reply. Notification to the
Idaho Supreme Court that Mr. May did not posses the record necessary to prepare
his appeal has been ignored. No record of evidence and exhibits has been provided
to Mr. May at any time. An example of this is that Mr. May does not even have a
copy of his sentence and judgment. Or access to any pre-trial transcripts, Motion
to Withdraw plea transcripts, or the plea hearing transcripts. The police reports
or any of the evidence used against him at any time. Mr. May claims that this
refusal to provide him with any necessary documents to efectuate his appeal and
petitions

is

a

deni a 1

of

due

processes

and

contrary

to

consti tuti ona 1

protections, which in turn prejudices his rights and case.
The evidenc that exists that prove that Mr. May had a colorable claim of
innocence is the fact that the so called vistims and states witnesses testified
at the prreliminary hearing on September 3, 2010: That they in fact blocked the
road with their bodies preventing Mr. may from driving thru, stopping him with
the intehnt on doing him harm. Mr. Newman and Mr. Lambert threatend Mr. May, and
admittadly had a weapon (see 911 call made by Lambert stating to the operator he
woulci shoot May with his gun.
Mr. May upon being detained by the assailants and fearing for his safety
reached into his vehicle and obtained a gun and fired a number of shots into the
parked car that was empty to warn off the ass a i 1ants. One round ri cacheted off
the vehicle and struck Lambert in the leg. The evidence of the ricocheted round
was not allowed into evidence nor the circumstances surrounding it.
The assailants own actions and testimony prove they were the aggressers, and
6

that May had a right to defend himself when the assailants admitted they blocked
the road in an effort to detain and obviously assault May. They admittedly were
armed, and had evil intent toward May, knowing he was attempting to reach a house
on the block on the other side of their position. These two acts:
detaining

while

blocking

the

right

of way,

while armed,

is

Intentionally

conducive

to

a

'hold-up' or highway robbery, or kidnapping by force, all of which are felonies
giving Mr. May the legal right to arm himself and defend himself with whatever
means necessary, and if the assailant was injured in the process, the law states
he has taken his life in his own hands through his illegal actions and Mr. may is
not in the least responsible for any illegal act.

Least of all

assault of the

assaliants themselves.
Mr. may was entitled to withdraw his plea!

Mr.

May was entitled to have

counsel that would provide him with a defense at trial in the least. And Mr. May
was entitled to remove that counsel when it refused to provide constitutional due
processes entitled to every citizen. Furthermore, the trial court had no right to
threaten Mr. May when his counsels ineffectivness was brought to his attention
and a trial was requested.
The level of constitutional error in this case is profound. The impropriety
of coercion and threat to plead guilty obvious. Mr. May had a right to withdraw
his plea, go to trial, and fire counsel in order to do so. This was the issue in
the petition, and the issue ignored by the district court as well as the trial
court.
Al so of note is the fact that Mr. Anderson promised Mr. May he would get a
rider and do his time at a work center.

Instead, Mr. May received 30 years for

defendning himself, which was his right to do in all circumstances.
(See: Preliminary hearing transcripts anci 911 recording)(See also:
hearing).
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Plea withdraw

Mr. May plead guilty under protest, due to his counsel's insistence and the
court's refusal to force counsel to do his job. Also, at the time of plea, Mr.
May admitted shooting his gun and that one of the asailants was struck in the
process. But he had always maintained

that he was

assailants that accousted him, blocking his

path,

defending
armed and

himself from
dangerous

for

purposes of violence. This is not an admission of guilt, this is a defense.
When Mr. may insisted on withdrawing his plea prior to sentencing based on
an actual innocence claim and ineffective assistance of counsel, he had good
cause to do so, and was within his right to assert the defense and go to trial.
The court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the plea withdraw, and
refused to eliminate counsel that refused to go to trial with the defense.
Mr. may's motion to withdraw his plea (prior to sentencing) was denied, and
his right to appeal violated and also denied. His post-conviction was his only
opportunity to address the issue and it has been denied without due processes or
consideration of the actual innocence evidence and claims.
As already stated,

the assailants admitting

that they were armed and

blocking the road, with motive and intent to harm Mr. may, is enough colorable
evidence to have justified withdrav-Jing the plea based on an actual innocence
claim,

and

is

enough

evidence

to

warrant

a

proper

evidentiary

hearing

considering the plea withdraw and right o trial to present a defense of self
defense and right to defend when detained unlawfully on a public highway.
Every citizen of this state has the right to defend in the same manner that
Mr. may engaged in. And if he had even killed one of the assailants, his right
would not have diminished in any manner, as it is the law of justification, and
all robbers, kidnappers, assailants, and those intent on mayhem, take their
lives into their own hands when they violate any citizens going about their
business on a public road.
8

ISSUE ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING A PLEA WITHDRAWL PRIOR TO
SENTENCING; AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MR. MAY'S
PLEA WAS KNOWING; WILLING; AND WITHOUT DURESS!

ARGUMENT
The Appellant points out that he attempted to withdraw his plea, asserting
actual innocence prior to trial; Tried to fire counsel for his refusal to go to
trial and present Appellant's affirmative defense;

And was prejudiced by the

court when the court refused to allow disqualification of counsel and provide the
Appellant withdraw of plea and go to trial on the good cause shown of actual
innocence. The trial court did not officially accept the plea until sentencing,
so at the time of the motion to withdraw the plea, Appellant had a right to
withdraw for the good cause of assertion of actual innocence.
Appell ant argues that a defendant may withdraw a pl ea of guilty or nol o
contendere 'for any reason or no reason" before the court accepts the plea. A
defendant maywithdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere after the court accepts
it but before the court imposes a sentence if: (1) the court rejects a plea
agreement under Rule 11; or (2) the defendant provides "a fair and just reason"
for requersting ther withdrawal. An assertion of innocence is just reason and
cause. (See: Issue Two). (See also: U.S. v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir.
2005).

Courts must seriously consider all claims of innocence when the motion to

withdraw is timely. (see: Rule 11 and Ineffective assistance of counsel claims
below.
A gulity plea is not knowing and voluntary if induced by counsels' faulty
legal advice regarding elements of possible defense. U.S. v. Streater, 70 F.3d
1314,

1318

(D.C.Cir.

1995).

A fair

and

Appellant's plea because defense counsel
possible innocence. (see: Davis, supra.).
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just

reason

existed

to

withdraw

grossly mischaracterized defendant's

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must sho~,

that

counsel's representation fell below objective standard of resonableness, and that
there was reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors,

result of proceeding would have been different; this standard applies to claims
of ineffective assistance occurring at trial

or sentencing and to ineffective

assistance claims arising out of plea processes. (See: U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 6 and
Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 825 P.2d 94 (1992); the issue on appeal
the

dismissal

of

an

application

for

post-conviction

relief

is

whether

from
the

application alleges facts which, if true, would entitle the applicant to relief.
Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 780 P.2d 153 (Ct.App.1989).
May argues that the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, without allowing the

evidence necessary to support his claims. Relying on counsels contraversion alone
when the record showed an attempt to withdraw the plea and conflict of interest
with

counsel

descretion.

ignorred
May's

by

the

trial

application

court

alleges

that

and

dismissed,

his

legal

is

an

abuse

representation

ineffective because (1) he refused to present May's defense and go to trial,
counsel refused to move for withdrawal of his guilty plea, (3) counsel

of
was
(2)

lied to

May about the sentence, "telling May he would get a rider and do his time at the
work center,"

( 4)

when their was

Anderson to withdraw,

Anderson

a

conflict of

interest and May wanted

lied to the court about

the

circumstances

conflict and the court threatened May to keep Anderson as counsel or

Ben
and

proceed

without counsel, disregarding the actual innocence claim.
claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel

are evaluated under tf1e

tw-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See also: Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272, 787 P.2d 258
( 1990).

The

latter

"prejidice"

requirement
10

focuses

on

whether

counsel's

ineffective performance affected the outcome of the case. Hill v.

Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Strickland v. Washington
applies to claims of ineffective assistance arising out of the plea process. Hill

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. at 370. Where, as here, a defendant ir
represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea depends on
whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases. Hill, supra, at 56 and at 369.
Appellant argues that counsel has a professional duty to inform his client
of the practical implications of exercising his right to trial. see: Idaho Rules
of

Professional

Rules of

Conduct,

Professional

Preamble:

A Lawyer's

Conduct 1. 2 (a)

Responsibilities

pro vi des,

"A

lawyer

sha 11

client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... "
attorney

assumes

res pons i bi l ity

for

the

means

employed

to

(1990).
abide

Idaho
by

a

Although the
pursue

those

objectibves, it is for the client to determine the ultimate purposes served by
the legal representation. The Appellant specifically set for the grounds for his
apllication and ineffective assitance claims in his petition and under oath to
the district court

as required by I.C. § 19-4903.

The granting of denial of a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is left to
the discretion of the district court judge. the exercise of this discretion is
affected by the timing of the motion to withdraw, State v.
799,761 P.2d 1151

(1988).

before

requiring

sentencing,

Ballard, 114 Idaho

A less rigorous standard applies to a motion made
that

the defendant

present a

"just reason"

for

withdrawing the plea. Ballard, 114 Idaho at 801. 761 P.2d at 1153. Appellant's
good cause reason of actual innocence, and conflict of interest and lies of his
counsels deceptions supported

a plausible

granting the motion. see: United States

reason

for

withdrawal

and dictated

v. Webster, 468 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972).
11

Appellant argues that because he had not been sentenced yet, and the court
was waiting for the presentence report, deferring acceptance until

it can

be

reviewed, he may freely withdraw his plea. U.S. v. Shaker, 279 F.3d 494, 497 (7th
Cir. 2002). See also: U.S. v. DeBusk, 15 F.3d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1994). If the court was going to reject the plea May should have been advised of options to stand
by plea, withdraw it and attempt to renegotiate, or withdraw it and go to trial.
Because the court already knew may wanted to withdraw, the court did not inform
May of these options or a 11 ow witndraw when the promises were not going to be
kept, which is obvious from the 30 year sentence. A complete surprise to May. In
re Vasquez-Ramirez, 443 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2006).
Although May admitted an act, its action alone is governed by self defense,
and therefore not a crime. The factual
from

voluntarily

basis requirement protects a defendant

pleading guilty without realizing

that

his

conduct

is

not

actually within the charge. See: McCarthy v. U.S. 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969). There
was no adequate f actua 1 basis to accept May's p 1ea because the record fa i 1ed to
clearly reflect evidence the trial court relied upon to find that May possessed
requisite intent for crime convicted.
Appellant argues that if a defendant enters a guilty plea while continuing
to assert his or her innocence, then the plea is only constitutionally acceptable
if there is strong evidence of guilt. see: N.C.

v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38

(1970). A defendant is entitled to an opportinuty to show innocence if there is
no factual

basis to support guilt and the record supports

innocence as in May's case. See: U.S. v. Garth,
1999).

The trial

courts

acceptance

of May's

a

188 F.3d 99,

claim of actual
113-14 (3rd Cir.

plea without sufficient factual

basis for the charge was plain error effecting his substantial rights. see: U.S.

v. Monzon, 429 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (9th Cir.2005). Furthermore, the court or state
cannot induce a

guilty

plea

by

threatening

defendant or

by

mental

overbearing defendant's will. Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
12

coercion

ISSUE TWO
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MR. MAY'S POST-CONVICTION PETITION
WITHOUT APPL YING AN ACTUAL INNOCENCE STANDARD OF REVIEW- AND ALLOWING
EVIDENTIARY PROCESSES TO MAKE SUCH AN DETERMINATION!

ARGUMENT
The Appellant asserted an actual innocence claim and forthright claim of
defense to his counsel, and the court at the onset of the criminal proceedings.
counsel's failure and refusal to administer the defense, courced Appellant into a
plea, and the court refused to force counsel to defend Appellant even when it was
made clear to the court that he was
ineffectivness

and

conflict of

only

interest.

pleading
The

guilty

due

court disregard

to

counsels

the

claim of

innocence and disregarded the conflict of interest, and prohibited the withdraw
of the pl ea. The district court in the post-conviction proceedings refused to
consider or allow review of Appellant's evidence that supported his claim, or
revie\tJ of the evidence that wholly supported counsels failure,

including the

attempt by May to fire counsel prior to sentencing. The record itself supported
May's claims,
counsels

and the district court erred

claims

to

dismiss

the

petition

in simply

without

relyting

making

on

inquiries

the

same

into

the

evidence that supported actual innocence. and erred in not providing may with the
record of the exhibits submitted by the state but withheld by the court and state
from

the

petitioner

and

appellant.

These

errors

have

greatly

prejudiced

Appellant's right to due processes and a meaningly appeal and petition.
The Appellant argues that he has credible showing of "actual

•

innocence

II

under Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). See
also: Lee v. Lambert, 633 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2011).
The actual innocence exceptions to reviewing a courced plea and conviction
'serves as an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer
an unconstitutional loss of liberty,' guaranteeing that the ends of justice will
13

~vill be served in full." McCeskey v.

Zant,

499 U.S.

467,

111 S.Ct.

1454, 113

L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). See also: Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49
L.Ed/ .2d 1067 (1976).
/\s the Court v1arned in Holland: Id., at 2562. "It is difficult to imagine a
stronger equitable claim for keeping open the courthouse doors than one of actual
innocence. "the ultimate equity on the prisoner's side." Withrow v. vJilliams, 507
U.S. 680,700, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.ed.2d 407 (1993).(0'Connor,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)(noting that

the

Supreme Court

recognized that, a sufficient showing of actual
"standing

alone,

to

outweigh

other concerns

prisoner's constitutional claims"). Indeed,

"continuously has

innocence" is normally enough,

and

justify adjudication

of the

"the individual interest in avoiding

injustice is most compelling in the context of actual

innocence." Schulp, 513

U.S. at 324.
/\n actual innocence exception to the provisions does not foster abuse or
delay, but instead recognizes that in extraordinary cases, the social interests
of

finality,

imperitive

of

comity,

and

correcting

conserving
a

judicial

fundamentally

resources

unjust

'must

yield

incarceration."

to

Murray

the

v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986).
[C]oncern

about

the

injustice

that

results

from

the

conviction

of

an

innocent person has long been at the core of our criminal justice system. That
concern is reflected, in the "fundamental value determination of our society that
it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." 513
U.S. at 325 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d
368 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring)).
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CONCLUSION
Mr. May filed his post-conviction petition

in a timely manner.

He also

submitted his Motion to Withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. furthermore, Mr.
may went before the trial court prior to sentencing and attempted to explain the
deprivation and assert his innocence and conflicts with counsels failures which
courced him into believing he could not exercise his right to trial, all of which
fell

on deaf ears.

These actions of the defendant/appellant preserved these

issues for appeal, and should have been regarded without the unceramonious method
of simply putting the counsel on the stand to lie again about his actions. It's a
given that counsel is not going to admit their misconduct in the fifth district.
Refusing to provide Mr. may with the record of his proceedings has also
denied him fair due processes, but at the same time, it has notleft the errors
wholly in the dark as the respondents would prefer. The colorable evidence of
innocence is clear, profound, and readily available for the court to review and
determine the validity of it,

regardless of the deception of the state and

counsel.
the Supreme Court has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial
power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take
steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense.
This

elementary

principle,

grounded

in

significant

Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental

part

on

fairness,

the

Fourteenth

derives

from

the

belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a
defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake. In recognition of this right, the
Supreme Court held over 30 years ago that once a State offers to

criminal

defendants the opportunity to appeal

a trial

their

cases,

it must

provide

transcript to an indigent defendant if the transcript is necessary to a decision
15

on the merits of the appeal. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100
L.Ed. 891 (1956). Since then, the Court has held that an indigent defendant may
not be required to pay a fee before filing a notice of appeal of his conviction,
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959).
"Meaningful access to justice has been the consistent theme of these cases.
We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself
assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal trial
is fundamentally unfair if the state proceeds against an indigent defendant
without making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the
building

of

an

effective

defense."

Fundamental

fairness

entitles

indigent

defendants to 'an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the
adversary system." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341
(1974). See also: Britt v. north Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 432,433,
30 L.ed.2d 400 (1971).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The appellant prays this Court will overturn his conviction, invalidate his
guilty plea and order a trial on the evidence supporting actual innocence and his
right to defend against unlawful actions against him.

Dated This

b day

of

}(oYet,ber,

2014.

MARKCUS RAYMOND MAY #99474
Appellant prose
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I,

Markcus may

/1/o ve,1' bt!- r
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I mailed a true and correct copy of:

6 day of

--------

APPELLANT'S INITAL BRIEF ON APPEAL
to the parties listed below, by placing same in the Institutional Mail System, by
handing it to the Institutional Paralegal Resource Center, privileged legal mail,
for placement in the U.S. Mail.
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